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FEDERALISM AWRY: THE
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE KWAZULU/NATAL
CONSTITUTION
STEPHEN ELLMANN*

Taking South Africa by surprise, on 1 December 1992 the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly adopted a draft constitution for the as-yetnon-existent state of KwaZulu/Natal. Unanimously adopted by a oneparty legislature without public debate,' and in such apparent haste that
it is riddled with bizarre typographical and stylistic errors, 2 this
constitution was reportedly drafted by two Americans, one of whom
defended the resulting document as being based on widespread consultations with experts and others. 3 Perhaps so. Yet the constitution that
emerged is, for an American, most striking not for its embodiment but for
its rejection of much of what Americans have learned about constitutional structure over our two centuries of independence. If this
* BA JD (Harvard). Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I thank Nancy Rosenbloom

for her helpful comments on this piece.
1 'Buthelezi brazens it out' Negotiation News 17 December 1992); 'Conservative US experts helped
draft constitution' Weekly Mail 4-10 December 1992).
2 See eg, Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal (hereafter cited as KwaZulu/Natal Constitution),
arts 70(c) and 71(d) (both containing the same sentence: 'All political parties shall be represented in
the committees of each house.'); art 82(a) (establishing a 'Privatization Commission' to 'consist of
nine highly qualified and independent experts . . . three appointed by the Governor, five by the
General Assemble [sic] and two by the Chamber of Commerce') (emphasis added). The initial size
of the Senate also seems to have been miscalculated, see art 107 (providing for election of a Senate
of 102 members by electing one Senator from every three constituencies of the House of Delegates)
and art 69(c) (providing for 350 constituencies for the House of Delegates). For other examples of
mis-drafting, see arts 47, 81(b), 95(e), 102(a), and 103(b).
Presumably the reason for KwaZulu's haste was the desire of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi to make
the draft public just as the government and the African National Congress were beginning a bilateral,
confidential negotiating session. Buthelezi, however, has claimed that this timing was just
'coincidence'. See 'Buthelezi sets a course for federalism', Agence France Presse I December 1992
(available on NEXIS).
3 According to the Weekly Mail, the KwaZulu/Natal constitution was drafted by Professor Albert
Blaustein and Dr Mario Oriani-Ambrosini. Oriani-Ambrosini is quoted as saying that '[slome of the
best minds in the world co-operated on this, with a very long consultation with political leaders, social
leaders and businessmen throughout the state'. Oriani-Ambrosini also explained that 'the reason for
the lack of publicity about the constitution prior to its approval was because "we're in Africa. Most
processes are not in the public eye .... "''Conservative US experts helped draft constitution' Weekly
Mail 4-10 December 1992.
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constitution were to be enacted into law, it would debilitate the central
government of a future South Africa - a result that not only ignores the
judgments about the proper scope of national governmental power
embodied in modern American constitutional doctrine, but resists as well
insights that were apparent to the framers of our constitution in 1787. The
KwaZulu/Natal constitution is, indeed, reminiscent of the notions of
interstate relations that prevailed in the United States before our
constitution was adopted, in the years of the 1780s when the United
States lived under the 'Articles of Confederation', a charter of government which quickly lost the support of many Americans two centuries ago
and ought not to be resurrected in South Africa now.
The Articles of Confederation traced the outlines of a confederation of
states which could scarcely endure each other's authority over them.
'Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States', the second Article declared. 4 The
Articles created no independent executive branch of government, and
scarcely any judicial branch. 5 Instead, what national power they
conferred they placed in the hands of the Continental Congress. But the
Continental Congress lacked so basic an authority as the power to tax the
citizens of the country. 6 It had no plenary power over interstate8
commerce, 7 and state protectionist legislation seems to have flowered.
Nor could it make basic decisions on issues of war and peace, or the
borrowing and spending of money, without the consent of a supermajority of the states - 9 of the 13 - or authorise the making of such decisions
by any executive body during the periods when Congress itself was not in
session. 9 Even when the Congress did act, it lacked enforcement power,
for although Article XIII provided that '[e]very State shall abide by the
determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all
questions which by this confederation are submitted to them',' 0 no
enforcement machinery was provided, and many of the states 'acted as if
compliance with Article XIII was wholly optional'.tl Amendments to this
structure, finally, could only be made with the agreement of 'the
Legislatures of every State'.12
4 Articles of Confederation, art In. The Articles were drafted in 1777, but not ratified by the last of the
original thirteen states until 1781.
5 See Articles, arts IX, X.
6 Articles, art VIII.
7 See Articles, art IX, para 1.
8 See Gibbons v Ogden 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 223-26 (1824) (Johnson J, concurring); Daniel A Farber
& Suzanna Sherry A History of the American Constitution (1990) 25.
9 Articles, art IX, para 6; art X.
10 Articles, art XIII.
11 Farber & Sherry op cit note 8 at 24.
12 Articles, art XIII.
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The Articles of Confederation failed in the eyes of many of the people
who lived under them. Their failure provided part of the impetus for the
framing of the constitution which the United States now has, a
constitution which took care to confer legislative, executive and judicial
powers on the national government, and which described the national
government's powers in much more expansive terms than had the
Articles. Over time, moreover, the American understanding of the
powers of the nation has expanded vastly beyond what the Framers
appear to have intended. In part, this change has been the result of the
country's adaptation to the demands of a complex modern society, whose
massive economy, swift communications and large, diverse population
seem to require a large and powerful government. In part, however, this
change has not been merely technological, but instead has been the result
of the country's growing belief that a powerful national government could
protect the people of the country from oppression, and in particular from
oppression by their states. This lesson, first taught to the country as the
Union Armies fought the Civil War that resulted in the freeing of the
slaves, was later given constitutional expression in the Reconstruction
Amendments, whose enforcement clauses provided a new and profound
source of federal power.13 The KwaZulu/Natal constitution rejects the
pre-eminence of the national government of the modern United States
(and many other contemporary nations) - but it also rejects the vision of
a limited, yet still powerful, national government which the United States
endorsed two centuries ago. A future South Africa may need a measure
of regional autonomy, which the KwaZulu/Natal constitution would
protect with a vengeance; but it will also need an effective national
government, and no such government could emerge under this constitution. In what follows, we will examine the approach the KwaZulu/Natal
constitution takes, both in its general emphasis on state sovereignty and
in the specific allocations of powers which it envisages. Before we turn to
this constitution, however, it will be helpful to look briefly at the stance
on national power taken by the United States constitution.
The United States constitution begins by declaring that it is the work of
'We the People of the United States'. In one of the most important of the
decisions of the early Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall insisted that
the constitution 'proceeds directly from the people' and 'is [in the words
of the Preamble] "ordained and established" in the name of the people'. 14
Because the people of the United States created the national government, Marshall maintained, it was fallacious to assert, as one party (the
state of Maryland) had, that '[t]he powers of the general government...
are delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be
13 The Reconstruction Amendments were the Thirteenth (prohibiting slavery), the Fourteenth
(securing rights of due process and equal protection against the states), and the Fifteenth (prohibiting
denial of the right to vote on the basis of race).
14 McCulloch v Maryland 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 403 (1819).
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exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme
dominion'.15 Three years earlier, in another of the foundational cases of
American constitutional law, Justice Story had insisted that the Supreme
Court had the power to review and correct the judgments of state
supreme courts, despite the claim that such authority impinged on state
sovereignty. Story wrote that '[i]t is a mistake that the constitution was
not designed to operate upon states, in their corporate capacities. It is
crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the
states in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives'. 1 6 For Story
and Marshall, the idea that the federal government was 'supreme within
its sphere of action' was essential, 17 and this claim of supremacy found
direct textual support in the new constitution's 'supremacy clause',
which declared that:
'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.'I 8

It remained, of course, to determine just what sphere of action the
constitution did entrust to the national government, and by no means
everyone agreed with Marshall and Story in their answers to this question
- but their position has stood the test of time, and (in the Civil War) of
arms.
The tone of the KwaZulu/Natal constitution on the issue of sovereignty
could hardly be more different. Whether or not this constitution was
meant as an implicit threat of secession, it certainly outlines a relationship
between state and nation in which state sovereignty is intensely and
repeatedly insisted upon. This stance was evident in Chief Buthelezi's
statement in early December 1992, that '[iut is intended that, once ratified
by the electorate of KwaZulu/Natal, the new constitution will stand in
force, regardless of the direction taken by the constitutional process of
South Africa'. 19 But the sentiment is no less apparent in the draft
constitution itself. Article 3 of this draft announces, under the title,
'Relationship with the Federal Republic of South Africa' (a relationship
with an entity that does not, and may never, exist):
'The State of KwaZulu/Natal is a sovereign member state of the Federal Republic of
South Africa. The State of KwaZulu/Natal recognizes its obligations toward the Federal
Republic of South Africa and the other member states of the Federal Republic of South
Africa in so far as they do not infringe upon the rights, powers and liberties guaranteed

15 Ibid at 402.
16 Martin v Hunter's Lessee 14 US (I Wheat) 304, 343 (1816).
17 McCulloch v Maryland supra note 14 at 405.
18 US Constitution, art V1, para 2.
19 John Carlin 'Buthelezi says he may break away from SA' The Independent 2 December 1992 at 13
(available on NEXIS).
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by this constitution to the citizens of Natal/KwaZulu [sic] and to the State of
KwaZulu/Natal. The sovereignty of the State of KwaZulu/Natal as asserted under this
constitution is indivisible, inalienable and untransferable.'°

In section after section, the KwaZulu/Natal constitution reiterates this
claim of sovereign power. Not surprisingly, where the United States
constitution insists on the supremacy of national law, the KwaZulu/Natal
constitution declares itself 'the supreme law of the State', and 'recognize[s]' national law only 'in so far as . . . not inconsistent with this
constitution'. 21 Everyone who holds office in KwaZulu/Natal must 'take
22
an oath or a solemn affirmation to uphold and defend this constitution'
- potentially a striking contrast to the United States constitution, which
requires all federal and state officeholders to 'be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this [national] Constitution'.23
Lest there be any doubt, another section declares that '[n]o power of
the Federal Republic of South Africa shall be legitimately exercised and
valid in the State of KwaZulu/Natal if inconsistent with the principles and
provisions of this constitution'. 24 KwaZulu/Natal's Constitutional Court
is given the power to declare 'the illegitimacy within the State of actions
or legislation of the Federal Republic of South Africa' ;25 in the mangled
syntax of still another provision, this court's decisions 'shall be [ie, make]
ineffective in the territory of the State any action or law of the Federal
Republic of South Africa which is in conflict with this constitution' .26 The
court's jurisdiction to make such pronouncements is labelled 'exclusive'
- exclusive, perhaps, of even national courts' purview. 27
Nor is KwaZulu/Natal's assertion of sovereign authority limited to
declarations of power and provisions for judicial enforcement. A series of
other sections of the constitution set out to enhance the status of
KwaZulu/Natal in ways that would block - potentially even by force of
arms - the aspirations of a national government. Since power does
ultimately grow in good measure out of the barrel of a gun, the
20 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 3.

21 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, arts 14, 12.
22 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 60.
23 US Constitution, art VI, para 3.
24 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(c).
25 KwaZululNatal Constitution, art 102(b).
26 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 102(d). The new state could also repudiate actions of the past
national governments, under art 110.
27 See KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 100, which gives the Constitutional Court 'original and
exclusive jurisdiction' of, among other cases, the 'resolution of disputes on the legitimacy of the
exercise within the territory of the State of federal powers in matters reserved to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of South Africa'. Elsewhere, in art 67(a), KwaZulu/Natal
'recognizes' the national government's power 'to exercise exclusive ... judicial functions ... in...
organization and administration of the federal system of justice in the subject matters of federal
prerogative' (emphasis added).
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constitution's provisions on military matters deserve especially careful
study.
As it happens, this constitution pays close attention to these matters, in
provisions that both restrictthe national government's ability to work its
will and arm the state of KwaZulu/Natal. National military power was a
matter of concern to the citizens of the early United States as well, 28 but
the provisions of the KwaZulu/Natal constitution tilt the balance of state
as opposed to national military power in favour of the states to a degree
that may not have been contemplated in the United States even in the late
eighteenth century, and that is completely inconsistent with the modern
American recognition of 'the supremacy of federal power in the area of
military affairs'. 29 Thus one KwaZulu/Natal provision declares that '[n]o
Federal armed forces or armed forces of other states may enter or be
stationed in the State of KwaZulu/Natal without the approval of the
31
State' 30 - a limit with no parallel in the United States constitution.
Another provides that every citizen has 'the sacred duty to defend the
territory of the State';32 it goes on to announce a comparable duty to
protect the territory of the nation against 'any external enemy', but only
'when so required' - a qualification which at least bespeaks a greater
33
enthusiasm for defending the state than the nation.
One way that KwaZulu/Natal will defend its territory is presumably
through its militia. Service in this militia can be made compulsory, 34 a
power which might be employed to establish a standing state army under
the title of 'militia'; there is no provision here, as there is in the United
States constitution, expressly forbidding the states, absent congressional
consent, to 'keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace'. 35 Moreover,
service in the national armed forces by citizens of KwaZulu/Natal can
only be 'on a voluntary basis' 36 - that is to say, the national government
28 The constitution is careful to protect the states' right to maintain militia forces, see US Constitution,
art 1, s 8, cl 16; ibid amendment 11. Moreover, it appears that 'the central concern of the second
amendment's framers was to prevent such federal interferences with the state militia as would permit
the establishment of a standing national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy'. L
Tribe American ConstitutionalLaw 2 ed (1988) 299 n6. See also, Clinton Rossiter (ed) The Federalist
No 46 (1961) 298-300.
29 Perpich v Department of Defense 110 SCt 2418, 2428 (1990).
30 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(b).
31 That the absence of such a limit was important to the course of United States history is reflected in
the fact that the Civil War began when Southern soldiers fired on a national fort, Fort Sumter, in
South Carolina.
32 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 62.
33 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 62. Whether KwaZulu/Natal would acknowledge the authority of
the national government to find that national defence was indeed 'required' is not stated; assuming
that the constitution does cede this much authority to the national government, the only method it
offers the national government for enforcing its judgments may be in the KwaZulu/Natal courts! See
note 27.
34 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 98(a).
35 US Constitution art 1, s 10 para 3.
36 KwaZuluNatal Constitution, art 98(d).
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cannot draft citizens from KwaZulu/Natal into the national armed forces.
Even in time of war, the national government evidently will not be trusted
to draft citizens of KwaZulu/Natal; instead, 'KwaZulu/Natal shall
conduct military proscription [sic, presumably "conscription"] through
the militia to supply armed forces to the nation'. 37 The United States
under the Articles of Confederation similarly relied on the states to
supply the nation with soldiers, 38 and its experience with this system was
evidently not a happy one. 39 The new constitution gave the national
government of the United States explicit power to 'raise and support
Armies', and this power has repeatedly been implemented through the
use of military drafts. 40 Finally, the Federal Republic is ceded the power
to 'summon the State militia' to defend the nation 'from an external
enemy', 41 but not, it would seem, to summon these forces to defend the
nation against internal rebellion - least of all, one might infer, against
42
internal rebellion in KwaZulu/Natal!

Not content to secure a monopoly on military force within the borders
of KwaZulu/Natal, the constitution also grants the state sweeping

emergency powers. The constitutional regulation of emergency powers
has properly been an important concern for South Africans, emerging as
they are from the long night of the states of emergency of the 1980s, and
both the South African Law Commission and the African National
Congress have developed proposals which could circumscribe future

emergency authority in significant ways. 43 Against this background, the
37 Ibid.
38 See Articles, art IX, para 5 (describing system of obtaining 'land forces').
39 See Selective Draft Law Cases 245 US 366, 380-81 (1918).

40 US Constitution, art 1, s 8, cl 12; ibid cl. 13 (Navy). Though the constitution contains no explicit
authorisation of a federal draft, conscription has been used repeatedly in our history, and its
constitutionality was affirmed in Selective Draft Law Cases 245 US 366 (1918). (This case found some
tangential support for its conclusion in what evidently were compulsory military service laws of the
Orange Free State and the South African Republic. Ibid at 378-79 nl.) As the Vietnam War era
demonstrated, however, the wisdom of using this power remains very much open to debate.
41 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(b).
42 The United States constitution is much less restrictive. It empowers Congress '[tlo provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions'. US
Constitution, art 1, s 8, cl 15. (Under modem law, moreover, the national government is not even
confined to these purposes when it calls forth the state militias; by 'federalizing' these state forces, the
national government becomes entitled to deploy them for any and all purposes for which regular
federal troops can be used. See Perpich v Department of Defense 110 SCt 2418, 2426-30 (1990).)
Moreover, although one clause of Article IV, s 4 might be read to authorise the national government
to suppress 'domestic Violence' within a state only on request of the state, another section, the
'Guarantee Clause', requires the national government to 'guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government', and this clause was invoked during the Civil War as a basis for the
national government's suppression of what it viewed as rebellion by the Southern states. See R
Rotunda & J Nowak Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw: Substance and Procedure(1992) vol 2 319-20.
The Civil War settled on the battlefield the proposition that the national government can subdue
insurrection by states entirely without their consent.
43 See art 34(2) in South African Law Commission Interim Report on Group and Human Rights Project
58 (August 1991) at 698-9; African National Congress ANC Draft Bill ofRights (preliminary revised
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emergency provision of the KwaZulu/Natal constitution is particularly
dismaying. The Governor is authorized by art 99 to declare an
emergency, and to provide in the Declaration of Emergency 'a general
indication of the type of emergency and . . . in general terms which
powers and resources of the State, of the Regions, of the municipalities
or of the citizenry the Governor intends to employ to respond to the
emergency, how such powers and resources are expected to be employed
and for how long, and other measures and actions the Governor intends
to undertake'. 44 There is no substantive limit on what powers and
resources the Governor may employ, other than the pious declaration
that emergency action must respect constitutional rights 'to the fullest
extent possible under the circumstances'. 45
There is, to be sure, a procedural limit, namely that the Governor must
obtain the ratification of the General Assembly, or in their absence the
approval of the Constitutional Court. 46 Moreover, the General Assembly
or the Court 'may terminate or modify the terms of the Declaration of
Emergency at any time'. 47 But whatever confidence these safeguards
might otherwise offer (and obviously that confidence is no greater than
the likely independence of KwaZulu/Natal legislators or judges from
executive domination), their efficacy is seriously undercut by the
Governor's power to require that these other bodies consider emergency
matters only 'behind closed doors', and to insist 'that the contents of the
Declaration of Emergency be kept secret'. 48 Article 99, in short,
authorises the Governor to make, and enforce, secret law.
In other, more prosaic, ways, this constitution pursues its concern with
limiting the power of the national government, and enhancing the power
of the new state of KwaZulu/Natal. The constitution converts all property
held by the national government in KwaZulu/Natal into property of
KwaZulu/Natal - and does so without any apparent compensation to the
citizens of the nation whose collective investment has just been taken by
the citizens of a single state. 49 Probably an even greater interference with

version) (1993), arts 18-23; S Ellmann 'A Constitution for All Seasons: Providing Against
Emergencies in a Post-Apartheid Constitution' (1989) 21 Columbia Human Rights LR 163; N
Haysom 'States of Emergency in a Post-Apartheid South Africa' (1989) 21 Columbia Human Rights
LR 139. See generally, S Ellmann In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of
Emergency (1992).
44 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 99(a).
45 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 99(d).
46 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 99(a). If neither the General Assembly nor the Constitutional Court
can be convened, fallback procedures are also provided. Ibid. It deserves mention that this section
does not make clear that affirmative ratification or approval is required; it might be that inaction by
the legislature or the court would suffice.
47 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 99(c).
48 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 99(c).
49 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 109. This taking without compensation is especially striking since all
other expropriations of property are 'subject to the prompt payment of a fair market value
compensation'. Ibid art 35.
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national power is the constitution's imposition of drastic limits on
national taxation, a central power of the federal government in the
United States 50 and, as noted earlier, a central area of inadequate
authority under the Articles of Confederation. Simply put, the national
government cannot tax within KwaZulu/Natal except 'with the advice
and consent of the State of KwaZulu/Natal'. 5' Moreover, this consent is
to be rendered by the 'Joint Commissions [sic] on Finance of the General
Assembly', 52 and according to art 67(e) the Joint Commission is only
required to meet 'at least once every two years' to advise the national
government 'on the type and extent of Federal taxation and revenue
collection permitted in the State of KwaZulu/Natal'. 53 In case this
structure is not awkward enough, the same section goes on to say that
'[a]ny resolution adopted by the Joint Commission on Finance in this
respect shall have effects [sic] only in the second calendar year following
the year in which the resolution is adopted'. 54 Suppose, then, that the
national government were in 1994 to signify its desire to tax property in
KwaZulu/Natal. Perhaps the Joint Commission has already met in 1994
before this decision by the national government. In that case, it need not
50 See US Constitution, art I, s 8, cl 1; amendment XVI (income tax).
51 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(d).
52 KwaZululNatal Constitution, art 67(d).
53 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(e). The Joint Commission (or 'Joint Commissions', as art 67(d)
would have it) is a mysterious body. No other provision of the constitution appears to refer to it, or
to provide for its composition. Article 67(d) provides, however, that for the purpose of dealing with
issues of federal taxation the 'Joint Commissions' will be 'chaired ... by the Governor and integrated
with six additional members with voting rights representing trade, industry and labour and nominated
by the Speaker of the House and appointed by the Governor'. (According to art 67(e),
representatives of the national government can also participate, but without voting rights.) Since the
total size of the Commission is not provided, it is impossible to say just how much power over the
question of federal taxation has been delegated by this section to unelected representatives of 'trade,
industry and labour'. It is also unclear just how many representatives each of the three identified
interest groups - trade, industry and labour - will have. It seems plausible, however, to infer that
each of these three groups is intended to have two representatives, and if this is so, then it follows that
business (trade and industry) will have better representation than labour.
Such overrepresentation of business interests would be entirely in keeping with this constitution's
remarkable pattern of providing for representation of business, but not of unions, on a series of
important appointive commissions. See arts 82 (Privatization Commission, two members to be
appointed by the Chamber of Commerce); 90 (Civil Service Commission, two members to be
appointed by the Chamber of Commerce and four by 'representatives of consumer groups'); 92
(Regulatory Relief Commission, two members to be appointed by the Chamber of Commerce, two
by 'representatives of industry', and two by representatives of consumer groups); 94 (Environmental
Commission, two members to be appointed by the Chamber of Commerce and four by
'representatives of environmental groups'); 95 (Consumer Affairs Commission, two members to be
appointed by the Chamber of Commerce and four by representatives of consumer groups); 112
(Transitional Electoral Commission, two members appointed by the Chamber of Commerce and two
by the bar association). The only exceptions to this pattern are in arts 93 (Economic Development
Commission, two members appointed by the Chamber of Commerce, two by representatives of
consumer groups and two by 'representatives of the trade unions') and 106(a) (Commission on
Regionalization, three members each to be appointed by representatives of 'the trade, industry and
labour').
54 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(e).
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meet again in 1994, or at all in 1995, so it would not have to convene to
consider the national government's desire until 1996. In 1996, then, the
Joint Commission might adopt a resolution approving of this federal
taxation (or it might not). If it did give its approval, then the national
government could actually impose taxes - in 1998!
Having limited both the weapons and the financial resources available
to the federal government, the KwaZulu/Natal constitution also seeks to
circumscribe the sphere of national authority. Article 67(a) sets out a list
of national powers which KwaZulu/Natal 'recognizes', dealing with
matters including international relations and external defence, foreign
trade, air and sea law, intellectual property, the monetary system, and
'general principles of legislation to coordinate' a variety of fields such as
55
environmental issues, interstate commerce, and communication.
Broadly speaking, the function of the national government according to
the KwaZulu/Natal constitution will be to handle foreign affairs and
provide basic ground rules and coordination for domestic life. These are
not trivial functions -indeed, they bear considerable resemblance to the
functions that the framers of the United States constitution intended to
confer on the national government of the United States in the late
eighteenth century - but they are also far from plenary national
authority, and similarly far from the authority the United States
government actually wields today. For example, there is no recognition
of a federal power to spend for the general welfare, a power that has been
an important part of the authority of the national government in the
United States 56 - and indeed any such spending will be decidedly
confined by the limits on the federal power to tax.
To an American, the limits on the national government's power over
interstate commerce are also particularly significant. In the United
States, the constitutional grant of authority for the nation to regulate
commerce between the states has grown into a source of vast authority
over the nation's affairs, as the rise of a modern economy has made
virtually everything in some way connected to interstate commerce. 57 The
KwaZulu/Natal constitution is obviously concerned to prevent just this
result, although it may not have found the words to accomplish its goal.
Thus it 'recognizes' exclusive national authority to enact 'general
principles of legislation to coordinate economic development and foster
55 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(a).
56 See US Constitution, art 1, s 8, cl 1. The modern, expansive interpretation of this power stems from
Steward Machine Co. v Davis 301 US 548 (1937).
57 See US Constitution, art I, s 8, cl 3. After a shifting series of decisions on the scope of this power, the
Supreme Court abruptly and dramatically endorsed a broad interpretation of its reach in cases during
the New Deal. See, eg National Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 US 1
(1937). For an instance of the modem application of the commerce clause, see Heartof Atlanta Motel
v United States 379 US 241 (1964) (upholding a statute prohibiting racial discrimination in motels and
other public accommodations, on the ground that such discrimination affected interstate commerce).
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interstate commerce among the states'. 58 Plainly these 'general principles' are not meant to cover every aspect or detail of interstate commerce,
for the same section also recognizes exclusive national power to legislate
'to provide negotiation and procedural coordination of the State's
policies with national policies and the policies of other states in the field
[sic] of transportation, energy, interstate and foreign commerce, economic development, consumer protection, banking and social welfare in so
faras they relate to the interests of the FederalRepublic of South Africa'. 59
Modern American commerce clause doctrine would suggest that this limit
is no limit at all, because everything relates to the interests of the nation
- but surely that notion is not what lies behind the adoption of this
language in this document. One particularly striking illustration of this
document's sense of what the scope of state as opposed to national
concerns might be, can be found in art 81 which mandates the
establishment of '[an autonomous Central Bank of the State of
KwaZulu/Natal', to be 'independent within the parameters of the law to
use tools of monetary intervention in the public interest'. 6° Apparently
61
KwaZulu/Natal may have, in some measure, its own monetary policy!
Finally, it is important to mention one other missing power: an
authority, akin to that vested in the national government of the United
States by the Reconstruction Amendments, 62 to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens of the nation. No such general power is spelled
out in the KwaZulu/Natal constitution. The availability of such authority
has proven very important to the protection of constitutional rights in the
United States, but even without this precedent the failure to vest this
power in the national government of a post-apartheid South Africa would
be remarkable. Surely the government of a new South Africa, if it is
charged with no other responsibility, will at least be expected by most
citizens of the new nation to root out racial discrimination. If the
KwaZulu/Natal constitution were to become the model for South Africa's
governmental structure, however, the national government could only
play this part on consent of the states, or, in the constitution's words, 'as
63
authorized by a constitutional law of the State of KwaZulu/Natal'.

58 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(a).
59 Ibid (emphasis added).
60 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 81.
61 KwaZulu/Natal will not have complete monetary independence, for art 67(a) recognizes exclusive
federal authority over the 'monetary system' and 'general principles of legislation to coordinate the
regulation of banking, credit and insurance', Nonetheless the existence of art 81 seems emblematic
of this constitution's desire to identify areas of state prerogative even within such fields of intensely
national concern as the regulation of the monetary system.
62 See text at note 13.
63 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 67(b). Perhaps a 'rights-enforcing' role for the federal government
can be found implicit among the other powers recognized in this section, but the language of the
section does not make such inference easy. Nor is it apparent why, if such a power were meant to be
acknowledged, this intention would not have been spelt out.
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All of this, according to the constitution itself, will 'come into force the

day of [the constitution's] ratification by a referendum approving this
constitution with at least fifty one percent of the votes validly cast' 64 though Chief Buthelezi has affirmed his desire to negotiate a solution to
South Africa's constitutional debates rather than to 'go it alone'. 65 The
result would be a national government hobbled, and a state government

exalted in its powers. Perhaps this result in some measure reflects
consociationalist thinking, with its dread of majoritarian power and its
hope for government through enlightened cooperation among groups
whose separate prerogatives are firmly entrenched. I do not believe that

South Africa is so divided that it must turn to consociationalism, and so
abandon the engine for reform and reconstruction that a stronger
national government can provide. It is accepted on all sides, however,
that some limits on the authority of the national government will be
needed, and well-designed federalist structures offer one framework for
establishing those limits. Whether South Africans should adopt a federal

system to govern a post-apartheid nation is a complex question, and one
that will probably not be finally settled at least until a constituent
assembly completes its work. But those who might find a federal system
attractive, and who might find support for the federalist idea in the
constitution of the United States, should not be misled by the KwaZulu/
Natal constitution's effort to claim the mantle of federalism. This
constitution's 'federalism' was rejected by the United States two
centuries ago - and for good reason.
64 KwaZulu/Natal Constitution, art 112. This provision means that opponents of this constitution who
decide to boycott the referendum will actually be reducing the total number of votes required for its
ratification. Once in place, moreover, this constitution will not be easy to amend. An extremely
ambiguous provision directs that all rights 'inherent to fundamental human needs and aspirations...
as they will be recognizable on the basis of the principles underlying the provisions of this constitution,
are hereby entrenched in this constitution and in their essential content may not be modified by virtue
of constitutional amendments'. Ibid art 29. Even those amendments that can be made will require
approval by two thirds of the members of both houses of the General Assembly, and approval by 'the
absolute majority of votes cast in a popular referendum'. Ibid art 104.
It deserves mention that the members of the Senate, one of the two houses of the General Assembly
whose approval will be necessary for any amendments to the constitution, will be chosen by a process
which will not have to comply with one-person, one-vote principles. (The Senate's concurrence will
also generally be necessary for the passage of ordinary legislation. See ibid art 71 (semble).) The
Senate's members will come from Regions, either by popular election within the Regions (for
two-thirds of the Senators) or by selection by the Regional Congresses (for one-third of the Senators).
Ibid art 69(c). The Regions are to be set up with a view, inter alia, to 'ensur[ing] a proper and just
balance amongst the various parts of the State's territory', Ibid art 106(c), but there is no requirement
that they be equal in population. It is also not clear whether the members of the Regional Congresses,
which will elect one-third of the national Senators, must themselves be elected from constituencies
of equal population. See ibid art 83(c).
65 Speaking in Pretoria's City Hall, Chief Buthelezi reportedly said that '[tlhe KwaZulu/Natal state
constitution would be offered for acceptance in the negotiation process as a constitution for a state
in a federal South Africa if approved by people in the region through a referendum'. Buthelezi
declared that 'we would be quite prepared to negotiate about how we relate to other states in South
Africa and what the composition and powers of the federal government should be'. British
Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts 'Inkatha Leader Proposes Constitution
Based on Federation of States', SAPA dispatch datelined Pretoria, 8 December 1992 (available on
NEXIS),

